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Abstract:  
A commonly observed feature of differentiated product markets is brand inertia, the 
tendency of consumers to purchase brands they have purchased in the past. In this paper, we 
develop and estimate a micro-level random coefficients logit model to study two competing 
explanations of brand inertia, state dependence and heterogeneity, in the U.S. soybean seed 
industry. Specifically, heterogeneity is captured by brand-specific random coefficients and 
state dependence is incorporated through a brand purchase history variable. We further deal 
with two important issues in the identification: we apply a correction to the initial conditions 
problem similar to the procedure outlined in Wooldridge (2005); and to deal with price 
endogeneity, we use the control function approach in our nonlinear regression environment.  
The model is estimated using a large dataset of more than 200,000 seed purchase decisions 
by roughly 28,000 farmers over the period 1996-2016. We find that state dependence and 
heterogeneity are both important features of seed demand. On average, farmers are willing 
to pay (WTP) an additional $6.77/unit for a brand if it was purchased in the previous period, 
equivalent to about 15% of the average retail price. We also find that farmers are willing to pay 
large premiums for brand labels and the glyphosate tolerance (GT) technology, however 
there is considerable heterogeneity in this willingness. To investigate the implications of state 
dependence, especially as it relates to the introduction and diffusion of the GT innovation, we 
simulate several counterfactual scenarios (with/without state dependence and/or the GT 
technology). Our simulations show that state dependence has little effect on the diffusion of 
the GT technology, but it functions as a cushion for the structural benefits brought about by 
the innovation—it reduces the gains/losses in brands’ market shares. We also show that there 
is an “early adoption” advantage associated with the marketing of the GT trait, which is 
reinforced by state dependence. 
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1. Introduction  
The extent to which brand loyalty matters for demand has long been a motive of interest in 
economics and marketing (Bronnenberg, Dubé, and Moorthy 2019). In differentiated product 
markets, a well-established empirical regularity is brand inertia: individuals are more likely to 
purchase a brand if they have purchased it in the past. Among the potential behavioral 
explanations for this tendency, researchers have been particularly interested in the 
importance of state dependence, defined as the causal dependency of an individual’s future 
choices on their current state (Heckman 1981; Dubé, Hitsch and Rossi 2010). A growing body 
of research has shown that the presence of state dependence can have important 
implications for the extent of market power and pricing behavior (Dubé, Hitsch and Rossi 
2010), market structure (Dubé, Hitsch and Rossi 2009), the price effects of mergers (MacKay 
and Remer 2019), and the persistence of brand shares (Bronnenberg, Dhar, and Dubé 2009; 
Bronnenberg, Dubé, and Gentzkow 2012). Whereas the extant literature has focused mainly 
on the consumer-packaged goods (CPG) industry,1 this paper investigates brand inertia and 
state dependence in the context of an important agricultural input market: the U.S. soybean 
seed industry.  
Over the last few decades, the seed industry has been characterized by considerable growth 
and consolidation (OECD 2018). Much of this has been driven by the development and rapid 
diffusion of genetically engineered (GE) crops. First introduced in the mid-1990s, GE varieties 
embedding herbicide tolerance and/or insect-resistance provided farmers with drastically 
new technological solutions for weed and pest management. As a result, GE crops were met 
with considerable success and now exceed 90% of planted U.S. acreage in corn, soybeans, and 
cotton (Barrow, Sexton, and Zilberman 2014). The commercialization of GE varieties required 
access to both GE traits and elite germplasm, the latter arising from decades of traditional 
breeding efforts. Whereas GE traits were overwhelmingly developed by one company 
                                                          
1 In addition to those mentioned above, other studies in the CPG industry include Keane (1997), 
Seetharaman and Chintagunta (1998), Seetharaman (2004), and Horsky, Misra, and Nelson (2006). 
Sudhir and Yang (2014) and Train and Winston (2007) study the automobile industry, and Handel (2013) 
analyzes the health insurance industry. 
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(Monsanto), the ownership of germplasm was more dispersed. The highly complementary 
nature of these two building blocks (Graff, Rausser, and Small 2003) led to an early wave of 
acquisitions and mergers (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2004). Furthermore, the diffusion of GE crops 
was facilitated by Monsanto’s aggressive licensing of GE traits to other seed suppliers, a 
contractual strategy that also benefited from a parallel major strengthening of intellectual 
property for plants (Clancy and Moschini, 2017).  
Among the major U.S. crops, the soybean seed industry has perhaps undergone the largest 
transformation. The once common farming practices of saving harvested soybeans for seed 
use, and/or purchasing publicly developed varieties, have been replaced by the almost 
complete reliance on new proprietary commercial soybean varieties that embed the GE trait 
for glyphosate tolerance (GT).2 An ongoing area of research has sought to assess the 
implications of these changes for the industry and the welfare of its main players: trait 
developers, seed companies, and farmers. An essential ingredient for this research program 
is the estimation of seed demand. Beyond the assessment of the value of product innovation 
(Ciliberto, Moschini, and Perry 2019), a suitable seed demand model  would permit the 
investigation of other questions of interest, including the exercise of market power, related 
antitrust concerns that may arise, and the role of brand loyalty. 
In this paper, we develop and estimate a micro-level structural model of U.S. soybean seed 
demand. Specifically, we estimate a random coefficients logit model that allows for the 
presence of state dependence in farmers’ preferences for brand labels. To estimate demand, 
we draw on a dataset containing more than 200,000 seed purchase decisions by roughly 
28,000 U.S. soybean farmers during the 1996-2016 period. These unique data provide the 
requisite information on seed purchase histories, seed characteristics, and prices.  In 
developing and estimating the model, our main objectives are to: (i) identify the dollar value 
of state dependence for brand labels in the soybean seed industry; (ii) investigate whether 
farmer heterogeneity is an important feature of the demand for brand labels and GE 
glyphosate tolerance; (iii) assess the implications of state dependence for the adoption rate 
                                                          
2 Consider, for example, that in 1970 about 70% of planted soybeans were public varieties (Fernandez-
Cornejo, 2004). Based on the data used in this paper, by 2016 this fraction is less than 1%.   
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of a new major product innovation (in this case, the GT trait); and (iv) assess whether the 
presence state dependence confers an advantage to early providers of a new technology (the 
GT trait).   
The model we develop and estimate must address two important issues. The first issue 
concerns the identification of state dependence. The basic problem is that brand persistence 
or inertia (sometimes referred to as stickiness) can arise because of genuine state 
dependence or because of heterogeneity (Heckman 1981; Keane 1997). Heterogeneity 
describes the fact that individuals may simply have different, state-invariant, preferences for 
a brand. Failure to properly control for heterogeneity will tend to exaggerate the presence of 
state dependence.  A related but distinct issue is the initial conditions problem (Heckman 1987; 
Arulampalam and Stewart 2009; Akay 2012; Simonov et al. 2019). This problem arises when 
the researcher does not observe an individual’s entire purchase history and, if not properly 
accounted for, will also tend to exaggerate the extent of state dependence.   
To control for heterogeneity, we permit farmers to have normally distributed preferences for 
all brands. To address the initial conditions problem, we apply a correction similar to the 
procedure outlined in Wooldridge (2005). In particular, we include brand-specific indicator 
variables that code for whether an individual purchased that brand in their first period of 
observation. Despite such control for heterogeneity, it is still possible to obtain spurious state 
dependence if the assumed distribution for heterogeneity deviates significantly from the true 
distribution. Thus, as a final check for whether we have identified genuine state dependence, 
we conduct a reshuffling procedure similar to Dubé, Hitsch and Rossi (2010). The basic idea of 
this procedure is to reshuffle each individual’s choice sequence in a random way and then re-
estimate the model. If structural state dependence remains, then this suggests that 
unobserved heterogeneity has not been sufficiently accounted for.  
The second issue we face is the well-known problem of price endogeneity in demand models 
of differentiated products (Berry, 1994; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995; Nevo 2000). 
Although our model is estimated using individual choices, which may alleviate some concerns 
about endogeneity (Goldberg 1995), there may still remain certain unobservable factors 
correlated with both the price and demand. The most common solution to this problem is to 
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use two stage least squares (2sls) with instrumental variables (IVs). This approach, however, 
cannot be directly applied in non-linear individual-level discrete choice models (Train 2009). 
Therefore, we implement a control function approach, as outlined in Petrin and Train (2010) 
and Wooldridge (2015). Much like 2SLS, this consists of running a first-stage regression of price 
on all model variables and a set of excluded IVs. We then compute the predicted residuals 
from this first-stage regression and include them as a control variable in the random 
coefficients logit model. For IVs, we use the previous year’s soybean futures price interacted 
with brand and GT trait dummies. These IVs are in the spirit of the cost-brand interaction IVs 
used by Berto Villas-Boas (2007), and they exploit the fact that the previous year’s futures 
price affects a seed firm’s production costs.3  
Overall, we find significant evidence of structural state dependence, even after controlling for 
persistent unobserved farm-level heterogeneity. On average, having a previous experience 
with a brand increases its value by about $6.77/unit of soybeans, equivalent to about 15% of 
the average price of $45/unit. This estimate is quite similar to the dollar value of brand loyalty 
estimated for orange juice in Dubé, Hitsch and Rossi (2010).   We also find that, on average, 
farmers are willing to pay large premiums for brand labels and for GE traits, although this 
willingness to pay (WTP) can vary widely across farmers. For example, from 2011-2016, 
farmers’ mean WTP for the GT trait was $22.89/unit, with more 15% of farmers valuing GT at 
$35 or more and another 15% of farmers valuing it at $10 or less.  
Using the model estimates, we assess some potential implications of state dependence for 
the introduction and diffusion of the GT technology. We first consider whether structural 
state dependence impacted the diffusion of GT soybeans. Intuitively, state dependence could 
impact the diffusion rate of a new product attribute if, in the early stages of adoption, the 
presence of state dependence significantly increased the likelihood of new adopters 
becoming repeat or permanent adopters. To investigate this possibility, we simulate GT 
                                                          
3 Seed firms contract with individual farmers to grow their future commercial seed supply and this is 
usually done in the region where the seed will eventually be sold (Lamkey 2004). A farmer’s 
opportunity cost of growing seed for a company is what they could have obtained on the market. 
Thus, a higher futures price will tend increase production costs for seed firms. Note that by interacting 
the futures price with GT and brand dummies we aim to capture product-specific cost impacts.  
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adoption rates under a scenario with state dependence and under a scenario without state 
dependence. Overall, we find little evidence of inertia impacting the rate of GT adoption. We 
attribute this, in part, to the fact that most brands in the industry added GT to their varieties 
very quickly (consistent with Monsanto’s strategy to aggressively license the GT trait to other 
seed firms).  
A second counterfactual we consider concerns whether state dependence led to an “early 
mover” advantage for brands that were the first to embed and offer the GT trait in their seed 
varieties. In certain ways, this question is similar in nature to the question of whether there is 
an advantage to be the first brand to locate in a particular geographic region (Bronnenberg, 
Dhar, and Dubé 2009; Bronnenberg, Dubé, and Gentzkow 2012). To assess this issue, we used 
the estimated model to simulate market shares in four settings: (i) an environment with both 
the GT trait and state dependence; (ii) an industry without the GT trait but still with state 
dependence; (iii) an industry with the GT trait but without state dependence; and (iv) an 
industry with neither GT nor state dependence. Comparing (i) and (ii) reveals the impact of GT 
on brand shares when state dependence is present, and comparing (iii) and (iv) reveal the 
impact of GT on brand shares when state dependence is not presence.  
The analysis and results provided in this paper contribute to the literature in several ways. 
First, we provide new evidence on the distribution or heterogeneity of U.S. farmers WTP for 
the major U.S. soybean seed brands, and for the GT trait, over time. This complements the 
results reported by Ciliberto, Moschini, and Perry (2019), whose WTP estimates for GE traits 
were not modeled to vary across farmers. The second contribution of this study is to provide 
dollar value estimates of brand loyalty in an important U.S. agricultural input market. While 
brand loyalty in related industries has been documented using survey and interview-based 
evidence (Kohls et. al., 1957; Funk and Vincent, 1978; Kool, 1994; Harbor, Martin, and Akridge, 
2008; Sellars and Gunderson, 2018), there are no studies of brand inertia using revealed 
preference data in an agricultural context. Finally, to our knowledge, no other study has 
considered whether state dependence can confer an “early-mover” advantage in the context 
of an innovation in product attributes. Whereas research in Bronnenberg, Dhar, and Dubé 
(2009) and Bronnenberg, Dubé, and Gentzkow (2012) find there is a large, persistent 
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advantage to being the first brand in a particular geographical location, our exercise assesses 
whether state dependence confers an advantage to those brands first to locate in a new 
dimension of the product space.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide background information 
on the U.S. soybean seed market. Section 3 presents the data used in the econometric 
regression. In Section 4, we develop the demand model, discuss the identification strategy, 
and present the estimation process. Section 5 presents the estimation results, followed by 
the implied WTP distributions and demand elasticities. Using simulation, some implications of 
state dependence are considered in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Soybean Seed Industry Background 
The U.S. seed industry has grown considerably over the last few decades, fostered by 
sustained demand domestically and abroad.4 Part of this growth has been driven by 
technological innovation, the result of significant research and development (R&D) 
investments, partly owing to the changing landscape of intellectual property rights. As the 
industry has grown it has also experienced considerable consolidation and rising seed prices 
(Fernadez-Cornejo 2004). A major development affecting seed markets, maize and soybeans 
in particular, has been the introduction of genetically engineered (GE) traits in the mid-1990s. 
By using breakthrough recombinant DNA techniques of modern biology, it became possible 
to integrate certain foreign genes (from bacteria) into the germplasm of elite crop varieties. 
These genes confer traits to the resulting “transgenic” crops, such as herbicide tolerance and 
insect resistance, which are highly valued by growers (Moschini 2008).  
The GE revolution in the seed industry also benefited from the general strengthening of 
intellectual property rights for biological innovations (Moschini 2010).  This is particularly 
important for soybean seeds, the focus of this paper. Soybean varieties are self-pollinating, 
meaning that they reproduce true to type (unlike hybrid maize, for example). Thus, prior to 
                                                          
4 The size of the global commercial seed market was estimated at about USD 12 billion (ISAAA, 2016) 
in the United States and around USD 52 billion worldwide (Syngenta, 2016) in 2014. 
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the advent of GE varieties, farmers could rely on saved seeds (from the previous harvest) and 
could access, essentially at cost, varieties developed and released by public institutions (state 
universities). The introduction of patented GE traits, and the associated increased use of trade 
secrets and contracts, effectively permitted the industry to develop proprietary seed 
products (Clancy and Moschini 2017).  This greatly increased the profitability of R&D in plant 
breeding, which lead to increased investments and an early wave of industry consolidation 
through mergers and acquisitions (Fernandez-Cornejo 2004). By the year 2000, the two 
largest firms (Monsanto and Dupont) accounted for about 40% of the U.S. soybean seed 
market, a combined share that has risen to about 60% in recent years. 
Soybeans constitute the second most planted crop (after maize) in the United States. Unlike 
genetically-engineered corn varieties, which can have several traits—glyphosate tolerance 
(GT), corn borer resistance, root worm resistance, and their combinations—the only trait with 
major commercial relevance during our study period (1996-2016) has been glyphosate 
tolerance.5 Glyphosate is a powerful, broad-spectrum herbicide used in combination with GT 
crops. It can kill approximately 99% of non-glyphosate resistant weeds without harming GT 
varieties (Wechsler, McFadden, and Smith, 2018). By reducing the need to use tillage, as well 
as multiple types of herbicides, GT varieties permit an extremely effective (and simplified) 
weed control strategy (Perry, Moschini, Hennessy, 2016). Because of this, GT soybeans were 
rapidly adopted: first commercially introduced in 1996, GT varieties accounted for more than 
50% of the market by 1999, and more than 90% by 2007. This is despite the fact that GT 
soybeans command a significant price premium (Schenkelaars et al., 2011; OECD, 2018). 
Indeed, previous resarch has found that U.S. farmers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for the GT trait 
far exceeds its cost, resulting in significant net economic gains, especially in recent years 
(Ciliberto, Moschini, and Perry, 2019; Shi, Chavas, and Stiegert, 2010; Fernandez-Cornejo, 
Hendricks, and Mishra, 2005). 
                                                          
5 GE varieties tolerant to glufosinate did not achieve commercial relevance till very recently and, as in 
Ciliberto, Moschini, and Perry (2019), we do not distinguish between conventional and glufosinate 
tolerant varieties in our empirical analysis. 
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The marketing of seed varieties relies heavily on long-standing and well-known brands such 
as Pioneer and Asgrow. In addition, several brands can be marketed by the same parent 
company. For example, the company Dupont has primarily sold varieties under the Pioneer 
brand, whereas Monsanto has marketed varieties under several brands such as Asgrow, 
DeKalb, and Channel. Each brand typically offers multiple distinct varieties that differ in 
characteristics such as glyphosate tolerance, soybean cyst nematode resistance, relative 
maturity, and tolerance to iron deficiency chlorosis. Most brands currently market both 
conventional and GT varieties.6 
Table 1. Brand Market shares 
Market share 1996-98 1999-2004 2005-10 2011-16 
Monsanto     
Asgrow 0.133 0.166 0.161 0.217 
Channel 0 0 0.006 0.032 
DeKalb 0.078 0.054 0.037 0.003 
Kruger 0.013 0.017 0.013 0.006 
DuPont     
Pioneer 0.186 0.214 0.268 0.285 
Syngenta     
Golden 0.037 0.061 0.027 0.001 
NK 0.051 0.054 0.087 0.079 
Dow     
Mycogen 0.024 0.021 0.013 0.020 
Public     
Public 0.063 0.026 0.007 0.005 
Others     
Beck's 0.007 0.013 0.016 0.029 
Croplan 0.012 0.025 0.033 0.030 
Growmark 0.018 0.014 0.011 0.008 
Stine 0.041 0.031 0.024 0.021 
                                                          
6 Two exceptions are Channel, a Monsanto brand, which entered the market in 2010 and only offers 
GT varieties, and public providers (mainly state university programs) who offer only conventional 
varieties (See Fernandez-Cornejo (2004), p. 36, for a list of major public breeders).  
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Average market shares for the 13 largest brands over the considered timespan are reported 
in Table 1. Brands are grouped by their well-known parent companies such as Monsanto, 
DuPont, Syngenta, and Dow AgroSciences.7 We separately categorize public seeds and the 
seeds sold by brands not owned by the big four parent companies.8 Table 1 also illustrates 
some turnover in brands. Golden Harvest was phased out by Syngenta is 2012 and, in recent 
years, DeKalb is also being phased out (Monsanto is focusing this brand mostly in the maize 
seed market). 
3. Data 
The data used in this paper pertain to seed purchases by a large and representative sample of 
U.S. soybean farmers. This data is drawn from a proprietary dataset assembled by Kynetec 
USA, a market research company that specializes in the collection of survey data in U.S. 
agriculture. The data span the 21-year period 1996-2016. For each year, the seed purchases of 
more than 3,500 soybean farmers are recorded. The sample itself is constructed to be 
representative at the crop reporting district (CRD) level.9  Each soybean farmer in the sample 
is observed to make one or more seed purchases and the data contains detailed information 
on the nature of the purchase and the variety (e.g., variety name, brand, parent company, GE 
traits, price, amount of seed, acres planted). Although this is not a balanced panel data set, a 
large portion of farmers are observed over multiple years (and multiple purchases are 
                                                          
7 The company names in Table 1 reflect the industry configuration as of 2016, the last year of our data. 
Since then, major mergers and acquisitions are re-shaping the ownership structure of the industry—
the acquisition by ChemChina of Syngenta in Apr 2017, the merger of Dow and DuPont in Sep 2017, and 
the acquisition by Bayer of Monsanto in June 2018. The agricultural concerns consolidated by the Dow-
Dupont mergers were subsequently spun off as Corteva in 2019. 
 
8 The ownership of each brand as reported in Table 1 also pertains to 2016, the last year of our data. 
Brands’ affiliation with their parent company in some cases was the result of market consolidation 
that took place earlier in our sample. This is particularly true for Monsanto, who acquired Asgrow in 
1997, DeKalb in 1998, Channel in 2004, and Kruger in 2006. Also, DuPont acquired Pioneer in 1999; 
Syngenta acquired NK in 2000 and Golden Harvest in 2004; Dow acquired Mycogen in 1998. 
 
9 CRDs are regions identified by National Agricultural Statistics Service of the U.S. department of 
Agriculture (USDA). Each U.S. state comprises several CRDs, and each CRD includes multiple counties.   
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observed in the same year). As discussed further below, multiple observations per farmer are 
essential for identifying/disentangling the elements of state dependence and time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity as drivers of farmers’ purchase decisions.  
3.1. Products 
As noted, in this paper we develop and estimate a farm-level discrete choice model of soybean 
seed demand. An essential ingredient for this model is the definition of a “product.” The 
product definition (or product space) partially defines farmers’ choice sets, which include all 
possible alternatives that farmers may choose from. The value of modern soybean seed 
varieties primarily derives from two complementary sources: germplasm (i.e., the underlying 
genetics accumulated from past generations of selective breeding) and GE traits. The finest 
possible definition of a product would be in terms of individual varieties. For several reasons, 
however, analysis at the variety level is not feasible in our context. First, there are simply too 
many varieties10; the implied choice-set by a variety-level product definition would be too 
large to be estimated with a farm-level mixed logit model. Furthermore, individual varieties 
have limited geographic presence, as each is bred to be best suited to specific agro-climatic 
conditions (e.g., latitude). In addition, new varieties are introduced every year, and the life 
cycle of any given variety is relatively short (four to five years, on average).  
It is perhaps more helpful to think of varieties as forming “product lines” over time, as 
companies introduce improved new varieties that are embedded and built on the genetics of 
previous varieties. We presume that this continuity is captured by the “brand” (e.g., Asgrow). 
Varieties marketed by any one brand at different locations may differ, even considerably, but 
in any one local market one can expect varieties of the same brand to share common 
characteristics. Hence, we choose to define products by brand, and by whether or not it 
includes the GT trait.  
Specifically, to make the farmers’ choice set of the model tractable, but still include as many 
alternatives as possible, we rely on the 13 distinct brands illustrated in Table 1. Note that we 
treat the public/university seeds offered by all public sectors as a single brand, named Public. 
                                                          
10 There are totally 18,420 varieties in our soybean dataset. 
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These 13 brands account for about 70% of the US soybean seed market, over the period 
analyzed. All remaining varieties are aggregated into an “Others” group. To account for the 
important role played by the GT trait, each brand can be associated with two products, 
depending on whether or not it embed the GT trait. Because Channel only provides GT seeds 
and Public only offers conventional seeds, we have thus identified a total of 26 distinct 
products. In any one choice situation, however, a farmer may not have access to all such 
alternatives. To be more specific about that, we next discuss the definition of “market” used 
in this study. 
3.2 Markets and choice sets 
In our model of individual choices, a market is a time-specific location where residing farmers 
face the same choice set.  Following Ciliberto, Moschini, and Perry (2019) we define a market 
as a CRD-year combination. As noted, CRDs are multi-county sub-state regions identified by 
the USDA. This market definition is similar to the CRD-level aggregation used in market 
analyses by some of the major seed companies. Differentiating markets by years is a natural 
extension, as commercialized varieties evolve over time, and a calendar year contains a 
natural planting window. In our dataset, we observe a total of 3,791 markets across 233 CRDs. 
The number of markets in selected years, and the average number of choice alternatives (i.e., 
products) available to farmers, are provided in Table 2. 
Table 2. Markets and Products 
Year 
Number of  
Markets 
Average number of products 
Total GT  Conventional 
1996 165 5.60 0.61 4.99 
2000 182 9.02 4.95 4.07 
2004 174 7.17 5.33 1.83 
2008 178 6.06 5.29 0.77 
2012 188 5.87 4.88 0.98 
2016 189 6.24 4.81 1.42 
    
As noted, a farmer’s choice set can contain at most 26 alternatives. The availability of a 
product in a market is identified by the existence of at least one purchase record. Thus, 
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farmers residing in the same market share the same choice set. Note that, following the 
introduction of GT varieties, the number of products available to farmers initially increased, 
but eventually decreased as GT products crowded out conventional products.11  
3.3 Prices 
A common challenge in discrete choice models of individual choices is the construction of 
prices with transaction data only. The basic problem is that we observe the price for the 
alternative actually chosen by the individual, but we do not observe the prices of the 
unchosen alternatives. A typical solution to this problem is to compute average transaction 
prices and use these prices as the prices that individuals face for each alternative. For 
example, Goldberg (1995) , in her nested logit model of household automobile vehicles 
demand, uses the market-level transaction price (net price). On the other hand, Train and 
Winston (2007) use retail prices in a mixed logit model to study the declining market share of 
U.S. automakers over time. They argue that, although discounts are common, there seems to 
be little difference between the discounts offered by American, Japanese, and European 
manufacturers. In a study of consumer choice behavior in consumer packaged goods markets, 
where discounts are not common, Keane (1997) uses retail prices, and notes the potential for 
price endogeneity when using net prices.  
In our setting, discounts are common feature of the seed purchasing process—in our dataset, 
about 63% of 204,697 total observed purchases have a discount. A major reason is the timing 
of a purchase: farmers who buy earlier are often rewarded with a discount on the listed price.12 
                                                          
11 Similar to Train and Winston (2007), the model we develop is a conditional demand model—only 
soybean seed choices are considered, conditional on the farmer having chosen to plant soybeans on 
a given plot (i.e., there is no “outside option”). Furthermore, as discussed further beliow, we focus 
only on new seed purchses (observations where a farmer uses saved seeds are dropped).  
12 The probability of getting a discount is around 30% if a farmer orders their seed in March, April, May, 
and June, whereas the probability is about 80% if she orders before January. In a logit regression of 
whether or not the farmer gets a discount, we find that the probability of getting a discount is highest 
in August and decreases in this order: August, September, October, November, July, December, 
January, February, March, April, May, June. Additionally, the planting season of soybeans in the United 
States lasts from June to the end of October (Syngenta 2016). 
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To account for discounts in the construction of prices for each alternative, we adopt what we 
term a “contingent” price system. First, in each market, and for any given product, we create 
two prices: a retail price (the average of all observed retail prices for each product in each 
market), and a net price (the average of prices after netting out the observed discount in each 
market). For each farmer, we then identify whether they received a discount. If they did 
receive a discount, we set the unchosen alternatives’ prices to the net prices, and if they did 
not receive a discount, we set the unchosen alternatives’ prices to the retail prices. For the 
chosen alternative, we assume the farmer faced the price she actually paid, inclusive of the 
discount, if she received one.  
Our goal with this method is to capture the unobserved factors that contributed to the farmer 
obtaining a discount for the observed choice (for instance, a farmer able to purchase seeds 
early, and observed to obtain a discount for her seed choice, most likely would have been able 
to obtain a discount for the other alternatives available to her in the market).  We also note 
that our use of the observed net price for the purchased product (rather than the market 
price) fits the nature of the problem at hand. Unlike the case of consumer packaged goods, 
where shelf prices are typically common to all consumers, seed prices are typically negotiated 
between the farmer and the seller (e.g., dealers or seed companies’ representatives).  
Finally, we note that the dataset spans 21 years, a long period during which prices changed 
considerably. Consistent with the homogeneity property of the per-acre profit function, 
described in what follows, we express all prices in real terms by deflating them by the USDA 
crop sector index of prices paid. 13    
3.4 Inertia  
A major focus of our analysis concerns the possible presence of state dependence in farmers’ 
seed choices. To motivate this perspective, following Dubé, Hitsch, and Rossi (2010), Table 3 
reports the purchase rate and repurchase rate of each brand, presented as percentages. The 
purchase rates are the unconditional probability of choosing each brand, calculated as the 
market shares over the full time period. Conditional on the previous choice, the repurchase 
                                                          
13 The Crop Sector Index is published by USDA-NASS Quick Stats. This index takes 2011 as the base year. 
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rates show the probability of purchasing the same brand again.14 Note also that the purchase 
records of a given farmer may not enter the sample in consecutive years. When this occurs, 
we use the most recent period’s records. It is apparent from Table 3 that the repurchase rates 
are considerably higher than the corresponding purchase rate. In some case, the ratio of the 
repurchase rate to the purchase rate is extremely high. For example, only 1.28 percent of 
purchases were for the brand Growmark. Yet, conditional on buying Growmark, an individual 
had a nearly 76% probability of purchasing it again in the next period. These data are 
synonymous with persistence or inertia in brand choices over time.  Of course, as previously 
noted, this could because individuals have heterogeneous preferences or because of state 
dependence.   
Table 3. Purchase and repurchase rates of each brand  
Brand Purchase Repurchase 
Asgrow 18.00 78.37 
Beck’s 2.29 76.51 
Channel 1.42 54.88 
Croplan 2.78 61.72 
DeKalb 3.05 65.37 
Golden 3.08 72.81 
Growmark 1.28 75.77 
Kruger 1.49 74.75 
Mycogen 1.78 73.93 
NK 7.44 69.86 
Other 29.6 85.41 
Pioneer 24.12 86.19 
Public 0.87 57.05 
Stine 2.80 69.74 
 
3.5 Purchase sources 
The distribution of seed varieties to farmers is highly localized and typically run by 
independent agents, such as farmer-dealers, farmers’ cooperatives, company salespeople, 
and private wholesalers and retailers (Fernandez-Cornejo 2004). For large farm operations, 
                                                          
14 In forming Table 3, we do not use the initial purchase records of farmers. Moreover, such initial 
records are omitted from the regressions in the model, as discussed later in section 5. 
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seed companies may also sell directly to farmers through their sales representatives 
(Fernandez-Cornejo, 2004; Syngenta, 2016). The structure of this distribution system is 
illustrated in Figure 1. Based on this structure, we classify all observed purchases into the three 
sources that capture the main differences in seed marketing: “sales representative”, 
“dealer”, and “retailer”. Specifically, a purchase is designated as being from a sales 
representative if the farmer purchased the seed product directly from the seed company or 
their representative; it is classified as coming from a dealer if the farmer obtained their seed 
from a farmer dealer, an independent seed dealer, or if the farmer herself is a dealer; it is 
classified as coming from a retailer if the products came from any other source, including 
cooperatives, seed retailers, and grain elevators (seed retailers account for the majority).15 In 
our data, 46% of purchases are made from “dealer”, 35% are made from “retail”, and 19% from 
“sales representative.”   
Figure 1. The seed distribution structure in the United States 
 
In the econometric model, estimated below, we use the records of purchase sources to 
generate product-specific marketing variables. These variables potentially control for 
important sources of unobserved heterogeneity induced by marketing activities.  
                                                          











Note: Adapted from Syngenta (2016, p. 46) 
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4. Model Specification 
We develop a seed demand model under the presumption that farmers, on each of their plots, 
choose the preferred seed alternative to maximize expected profit. The structure of this 
payoff function depends on the production technology, the prices of output and all other 
inputs, and, of course, the price of the seed. Ciliberto, Moschini, and Perry (2019) show that, 
when the production function satisfies two reasonable properties—constant returns to scale 
in all inputs, and a fixed proportion between land and seed—per-acre expected profit is linear 
in the (suitably normalized) seed price, i.e., 
 ( )π π α= − .,ij ij jr w p    (1) 
Here i  indexes the plot to be planted (i.e., the choice situation in what follows), r  is the 
expected price of the output to be produced on this plot, w  is the vector of all inputs used in 
production (except land, meaning that the profit in (1) can be interpreted as returns to land), 
jp  is the price of seed alternative j, and the parameter α  captures the (constant) amount of 
seed per acre (i.e., the seed density).16  
Given this objective function, the problem for farmer h , in market m , on plot i , can be stated 
as that of choosing product j  such that 
 { }π ∈ ,max , 1,...,ij mj j J    (2) 
where mJ  is the number of available products in the market m  pertaining plot i .  
4.1 The econometric model 
To make this framework operational, we need to parameterize the profit function. In addition 
to the seed price, which enters linearly, we approximate the other structural determinants 
(e.g., output and input prices) of the per-acre profit function by a set of seed, market, and 
                                                          
16 Note that Ciliberto, Moschini, and Perry (2019) express seed prices on a per-acre basis. Here, 
however, we express seed prices on the typical per-unit measure used in the industry (i.e., per “bag”). 
Given the assumed fixed proportion between land and seed, the choice of units is immaterial. To 
translate one into the other note that, in our data, one acre of land on average uses 1.186 units of seed. 
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farmer-specific variables, in addition to the inertia variable that captures state dependence. 
Specifically, the per-acre profits for farmer h  from product j , for choice situation i  in the 
corresponding market m , are 
 π β δ α γ ν ε′ ′= + − + + + .h h hij jm h jm jm h b ij ijx w p I   (3) 
In this equation, hjmx  is a vector of seed characteristics possibly interacted with farmer or 
market-specific characteristics (the primary seed characteristics include the brand and GT 
trait), and β  is a vector of coefficients that capture the mean impact of each variable in hjmx . 
The term h jmwδ ′   represents the random coefficients portion of returns: jmw  is a vector of 
seed attributes possibly interacted with market characteristics (e.g., period dummies) and a 
subset of the variables in hjmx , and hδ  is a vector of normally distributed components with 
zero mean. Thus, for a variable common to both hjmx  and jmw , β  represents the mean impact 
of that variable and hδ  represents the farm-specific deviation from that mean. The variable 
h
mjp  is the price of product j  in market m  for farmer h , and thus the coefficient α  represents 
the impact of price on per-acre returns. Note that to simplify the notation in equation (3), we 
have not explicitly written that the household ( h ) and market ( m ) are uniquely identified by 
the choice situation ( i ), and the brand ( b ) is uniquely identified by the product ( j ).17 
Structural state dependence is captured by the indicator variable hbI  , defined as follows: 
( ){ } ,1hhb tI I b s b −≡ ∈  
where ( ) 1
h
ts b −  is the set of brands that have been purchased by farmer h   in the previous 
period 1t − . The indicator variable hbI  takes value one if the brand associated with alternative 
j  is in set ( ) 1
h
ts b − . As noted, because the panel is unbalanced, in some cases we do not 
observe a farmer in consecutive periods. When this occurs, we use the most recent year in 
                                                          
17 One way to express this explicitly is as [ ]m i , [ ]h i , and [ ]b j .  
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which the farmer was observed. Finally, ijν  and ijε  are residuals that capture any remaining 
unobserved variation in profits. We assume that the residual ijν  is normal and correlated with 
price and that ijε  is i.i.d extreme value. The fact that ijν  is correlated with price is synonymous 
with the well-known problem of price endogeneity. If this residual is not controlled for in 
estimation, then the estimated impact of α  will be biased. 
4.2 Price endogeneity and the control function approach 
Price endogeneity is a common issue in the empirical industrial organization literature. At the 
product-market level, the basic problem is that there are unobserved factors correlated with 
demand. If firms account for this unobserved characteristic in setting their prices, then the 
estimated price impacts will be biased. One partial solution to this issue is to include product 
fixed effects (Nevo 2000), however, there is still the likely possibility that there are product-
location-time specific unobserved demand shocks that are correlated with prices. As a result, 
an estimation procedure that utilizes instrumental variables is usually required.  
In our particular setting, there are several potential sources of price endogeneity. As 
previously noted, we compute prices in a way that accounts for discounts. This may enrich 
price variation but it could introduce endogeneity bias. More generally, there is the strong 
possibility of unobserved demand shocks that are correlated with pricing, not only at the 
product-market level, but also at the farmer level. For example, some farmers may have better 
relationships with their dealers, which could result in pricing behavior that takes into account 
a particular farmer’s preferences. A third potential source of endogeneity is measurement 
error in the price variable – the prices we compute for each individual’s unchosen alternatives 
are likely to differ from the prices they actually faced.   
In the extant literature, the most common approach to dealing price endogeneity is the “BLP” 
approach (Train 2009).  Most studies that apply this approach, however, use an aggregate 
discrete choice demand model. The “BLP” approach can still be applied with individual-level 
data; examples include Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004), Goolsbee and Petrin (2004), and 
Train and Winston (2007), but there are two major limitations to using it. First, there are often 
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complications with the contraction part of the algorithm, such as non-convergence (Train 
2009). Second, and more importantly, this approach does not control for endogeneity at the 
farmer level. An alternative approach that resolves both of these issues is the control function 
approach (Wooldridge 2015; Petrin and Train 2010).  Loosely speaking, the control function 
approach is similar in nature to 2SLS, but can be applied to non-linear models, and is 
computationally less difficult. Given these benefits, and the fact that we use micro data, we 
take the control function approach to address price endogeneity. The specifics of this 
approach are as follows.  
Recall that we assume that ijν  is correlated with price and that ijε  is i.i.d extreme value. We 
assume that prices are determined as follows: 
 ,hmj ij ijp zγ µ= +                (4) 
where ijmz  includes all variables in equation (3) plus a set of excluded IVs. The residuals ijµ  
and ijν  are specified as jointly normal. With these assumptions, the per acre profit function 
can be re-written as:  
h h h
ij jm h jm jm h b h ij ijx w p Iπ β δ α γ λ µ ε′ ′= + − + + +  
where the distribution of ijε  is still i.i.d extreme value and ijν  has been replaced with h ijλ µ , 
with the non-correlated component of ijν  asborbed into hδ , which includes normally 
distributed brand and trait specific random components. Note also that to allow for additional 
flexibility in the model, the control function coefficient is specificed as normal: ~ ( , )h N λλ λ σ . 
In terms of estimation, we first estimate equation (4) and collect the predicted residusals ˆijµ
. These residuals are then included as a control variable in the model.   
For the IVs, we exploit the fact that soybean seed firms contract out with individual farmers 
to grow their commercial seed supply for the following year (Lamkey 2004). The terms of 
contract are set such that the farmer is paid at least what they could have obtained had they 
planted and sold their own soybeans. This payment will therefore vary in response to changes 
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in expected soybean output prices.18 A standard proxy for a commodity’s expected output 
price is the futures price corresponding to delivery in the month following the coming 
season’s harvest.  Given this, we use the previous year’s soybean futures price as an 
instrument for the current year’s seed prices. This IV is not only be highly correlated with 
costs, for the reasons just noted, but will also not affect farmers’ relative demand for soybean 
seed products; i.e., it fulfills the exclusion restriction requirement.19 To allow for variation 
across products, we interact futures prices with the brand and GT trait dummies. This is similar 
to the approach taken by Berto Villas Boas (2007): in her paper on vertical integration in the 
yogurt market, she creates a set of IVs equal to the interaction of input costs with brand 
dummies.  
4.3 Identification 
Before proceeding to the estimation procedure, we informally discuss the intuition of how 
the model and data separately identify heterogeneity and state dependence. Heterogeneity 
is entangled with state dependence when pooling data across consumers (Bronnenberg, 
Dubé, and Moorthy 2019). Consider the following simple example of two farmers over the 
course of four years. In each year, each farmer makes a single choice between brand A and 
brand B. An extreme case of AAAA and BBBB as respectively farmer’s purchase sequence 
could be purely the result of heterogeneity or purely the result of state dependence or both.  
To disentangle state dependence from heterogeneity, the key is that we need to observe 
some switching between the brands, specifically caused by choice set variation. Suppose 
there is a shock in the third period, such as brand B introduces a new variety that significantly 
                                                          
18 If a seed firm buys its own land and uses that land to grow its commercial supply, the same logic still 
applies. Fluctuations in expected output prices will change the rental price of land and, therefore, the 
opportunity cost of seed production. 
  
19 If the previous year’s futures price is correlated with the current year’s futures price, it may correlate 
with a farmers’ decision of which crop to plant. However, recall that the model we estimate is 
conditional soybean demand model. Thus, there is little reason to think the previous futures price 
correlates with the demand for particular soybean product. Moreover, we include time specific 
variables for both brands and GE traits, which should capture any impact of future prices on relative 
demand.  
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increases efficiency in production, so the first farmer switches to brand B. If in the fourth 
period brand A adopts the same variety, state dependence is identified if the first farmer still 
purchases brand B, whereas the choice consistency should be ascribed to heterogeneity if she 
switches back to brand A. The case may be too specific in the real world, but it shows the 
principle: state dependence is identified if the unconditional (of choice set variation) 
probability of choosing the later brand increases after switch. The extent of state dependence 
is better measured with rich choice set variation: if the first farmer sticks to brand A with a 
relative small variation, but switches to brand B with a relative large variation.  
Examples of choice set variation used in the prior literature include changes in price, 
advertising, and the availability of alternatives (Sudhir and Yang 2014). In our context, there 
are two primary sources of choice set variation. The first source is seed price variation. 
Relative seed prices flucuate from year to year as different brands try to attract new 
customers. These fluctations can be in the form of explicit discounts or due to changes in base 
prices. The second source of variation is changes in product attributes and the availability of 
alternatives. In particular, the GT trait was not added to all brands at the same time and in the 
same locations. Moreover, certain brands phased out there conventional varieties faster than 
others. These changes will have resulted in some farmers either switching to a new brand or 
trying a new brand. A related source of variation is in the nature of a brand. Seed varieties 
have relatively short commercial life-cycles. For example, the set of varieties offered under 
the Asgrow brand in 2000 were quite different from the set of varieties offered in 2010. Thus, 
for farmers not loyal or partial to Asgrow, there will be ongoing uncertainty about the quality 
of the brand. From time to time, therefore, such farmers may experiment with a brand like 
Asgrow to obtain information about it.  
4.4 Estimation  
The model is estimated using simulated maximum likelihood, as outlined in Hole (2007) and 
Train (2009). The latent profit function, originally defined in (3), can be written more succinctly 
as   
 hij jm ijπ ϕ ε= +                (5) 
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where hjmϕ  includes all components except the IID extreme value error term: 
 h h h hjm jm h jm jm h b h ijx w p Iϕ β δ α γ λ µ′ ′= + − + +    (6) 
For a given realization of hjmϕ , the probability that farmer h  chooses alternative j  in choice 
situation i  is given by the familiar logit expression 














               (7) 
where { , , , , }h h h hθ β δ α γ λ=  is the vector of coefficients to be conditioned on. For each farmer, 
we observe a sequence of choices. The probability of that sequence for farmer h , conditional 
on  hθ , is given by the product of the logits:   
 ( ) ( )1
hIh h h
ijiL Lθ θ==∏                (8) 
where hI  indexes farmer h ’s final choice, and the set { }1,2,..., hI  represents farmer h ’s choice 
sequence (on average, a farmer makes 23.6 purchases overall and 4 purchases per year). 
To obtain the unconditional probability of an individual’s choice sequence we need to 
integrate out the random components, denoted by R , in hθ — , ,h h hδ γ λ . As outlined above, 
we assume that each of these random coefficients follows an independent normal 
distribution whose mean and variance are estimated (the means of hδ  are zero as they are 
already captured by β , as noted).  Thus, the unconditional probability of farmer h ’s sequence 
of observed choices can be written as 
 ( ) ( )φ= ∫ ,,h hL L R R M SD dR                (9) 
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where M  is the mean vector of random coefficients R  and SD  is the corresponding standard 
deviation. The probability is simulated using 200 Halton draws for any given value of M and
SD .20 Specifically, 
 ( )
1




= ∑                (10) 
where D  is the number of draws and is equal to 200 ( d  indexes each draw). dR  is a realization 
of the random coefficients from the d th draw from a given normal distribution. As noted by 
Train (2009), equation (10) is an unbiased estimator of hL  by construction. The log-likelihood 
for the model is 
 1ln ln
H h
hL L== ∑                 (11) 
The parameters are estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood in STATA using 200 Halton 
draws. Specifically, we are utilize the user written “mixlogit” package by Hole (2007), outlined 
in Cameron and Trivedi (2005).  
5. Results 
In this section, we first discuss our preparation of the estimation data, as well as present some 
basic summary statistics. We then present estimation results for the basic conditional logit 
model and the full mixed logit model. In section 5.2, using the coefficient estimates from the 
full mixed logit model, we compute and discuss WTP distributions for the main variables of 
interest. We then compute mean own-price and cross-price demand elasticities. Finally, in 
section 5.4, we consider the robustness of the state dependence result by conducting a 
reshuffling procedure along the lines of Dubé, Hitch, and Rossi (2010). 
                                                          
20 Halton draws are used to approximate the distribution of random coefficients. Because there is no 
closed form expression for equation (9), we simulate the equation by taking the mean of Halton 
draws. As noted in Train & Winston (2007), Train (2009), Petrin & Train (2010), 100 Halton draws is 
more efficient than 1000 random draws and 200 Halton draws is sufficient for simulation. 
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5.1 Data Preparation and Summary Statistics 
In total, the dataset contains 213,062 seed purchase records for 28,017 farmers. We clean and 
reformat the dataset for estimation of the conditional and mixed logit regressions following 
the steps listed in Table 4.  
Table 4. Data cleaning and reformation 
Deletion No. 
Original soybean choices 213,062 
Purchase records if purchase source is “From my own farm”, “I’m a 
seed grower”, or “New seed that was left over from last year” 6,890 
Purchase records if the seed is not newly purchased 1,367 
Purchase records if the product is “Public” with GT trait 108 
Choices in analysis 204,697 
  
(Following deletions will not affect purchase history)  
Purchase records of zero net prices 831 
Purchase records of year 1996, 1997, 1998 21,924 
Purchase records in markets with only one alternative  584 
  
(Following deletions will not affect available alternatives in one market)  
Purchase records of all farmers' first-time recorded purchase 62,548 
Purchase records of all farmers if they show up in less than or equal to 
3 years in the total time span 28,546 
Choices in regression 90,264 
  
(Expand each choice by available products in the local market)  
Observations in regression 1,057,637 
 
We drop all cases in which a farmer did not purchase a new soybean variety. These cases 
include the following purchase classifications: “From my own farm”,  “I’m a seed grower”, or 
“New seed that was left over from last year.” Next, because public varieties have note 
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included the GT trait, we assume the small number of cases in which they were associated 
with the GT trait was an error, and therefore drop these observations (108 in total). This leaves 
204,697 purchase records, which are termed “Choices in analysis” in Table 4. We highlight this 
number and this step because this is the dataset that provides all information used in the 
empirical analysis of this paper. However, the first three years of data (1996-98) are 
exclusively used to build farmers’ purchase history. In addition, the first year a farmer appears 
in the data (for many farmers this is after 1998) is used to create the “state dependence” 
variable, and thus such observations are not use in the logit regressions. Again, however, 
these records still enter the model through certain explanatory variables, such as the initial 
brand choices, the state dependence terms, and the marketing variables. Moreover, for 
robustness, we drop purchase records of farmers who appear in the sample only three or less 
year. The end result of this process yields 90,264 purchase records that provide the estimation 
data for the logit regressions (termed “Choices in regression” in Table 4).  For the model to 
be estimated, the data needs to be further expanded such that, for each individual choice, 
there is also a row of information for each unchosen alternative in the corresponding market; 
this expansion results in 1,057,637 “observations”. Descriptive statistics, calculated from the 
dataset of “Choices in analysis”, are provided in the previous Tables 2 and 3, whereas Table 5 
describes the dataset of “Choices in regression.” 
Table 5 shows that a farmer generally chooses about two brands (and also two products) per 
year, and the number of chosen brands doubles for the whole observed period of a farmer, 
suggesting some brand switching, which aids identification of structural state dependence 
(further discussed in section 4.2). Table 5 also demonstrates that, on average, a farmer 
chooses among 11.7 alternatives, with a minimum of two (note that we drop records in 
markets with only one alternative) and a maximum of 23 (recall that our product definition 
results in 26 possible alternatives). For a typical farmer, we observe about 8 years of data 
(recall the minimum is four, as discussed in the foregoing, and the maximum is 21, i.e., a farmer 
appears in the sample in every year over the 1996-2016 period). 
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Table 5. Descriptive information 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
No. of alternatives in one market 11.717 4.393 2 23 
No. of chosen brands of a farmer 3.730 1.831 1 11 
No.  of chosen brands in one year's 
purchase of a farmer 1.901 1.009 1 8 
No.  of chosen products of a farmer 4.659 2.538 1 17 
No.  of chosen products in one year's 
purchase of a farmer 1.994 1.084 1 8 
No. of recorded years of a farmer 7.984 3.689 4 21 
Retail price 44.924 10.900 8.757 89.646 
Net price 40.734 9.050 8.757 85.167 
Discount 4.189 4.321 0 37.363 
Note: the mean is calculated by averaging over all purchase records, rather than 
averaging over the markets or farmers 
 
5.2 Model Variables 
Recall that the regression model includes two primary sets of explanatory variables, 
represented by hjmx  and jmw . Within the vector hjmx , there are three types of variables: (i) a 
set of brand and trait intercepts, possibly interact with each and time; (ii) initial condition 
variables, and (iii) a set of marketing variables and their interactions with individual-specific 
purchasing experiences. Each of these three types of variables constitute 52, 15, and 6 
variables, respectively. Further details are as follows.  
In the first set of variables in hjmx , the brand and trait intercepts capture the average profit 
gains of each brand and GT trait. In the estimation, we classify our regression timespan 1999-
2016 into three periods 1999-2004, 2005-2010, 2011-2016 with the same length and interact the 
three periods with brand and trait intercepts to account for any time-variant effect. In the 
model they are coded as GT 1999-2004, GT 2005-2010, GT 2011-2016, and “brand”, “brand” 
1999-2004, “brand” 2005-2010 (“brand” refers to the brands listed in Table 1, except Public, 
- 27 - 
 
the baseline brand; we further take “brand” 2011-2016 as the baseline, which appears in the 
model directly as “brand” and we only report them in the following Table 6). For time-variant 
brand effects, they can be caused by introduction of different new varieties over time, or any 
brand-specific changes that happen nationwide. The time-variant trait effect may come from 
the commercialization of new GT patent, the emergence of glyphosate-tolerant weed, etc. 
Similarly, we only capture the national effect rather than the CRD-specific effect. In the 
conditional logit environment, case-specific variables, like time or CRD region, will not affect 
the choice decision if they influence all alternatives in the same way, so they come in the 
model by interacting with alternative-specific brand or trait intercepts. In our case, time-
variant brand effects are explicitly model, whereas CRD-variant brand or trait effects go to the 
error terms. Finally, the interaction variables of brand and trait, coded as “brand”_GT in the 
model, capture the possible different GT propensity over brands, which can materialize if one 
brand have more varieties associated with GT trait or bundle the GT trait with other desirable 
seed attributes, like soybean cyst nematode resistance. There are 11 interactions of brand and 
GT trait, excluding Public_GT, Channel_GT, and Kruger_GT for collinearity issues.21 
The second set of variables in hjmx  capture the initial conditions of a farmers’ choice sequence. 
Following the idea of Wooldridge (2005), we include initial states as extra explanatory 
variables to account for the initial conditions problem of correlation between unobserved 
heterogeneity and the initial state. By further assuming the unobserved heterogeneity is 
normally distributed conditional on the initial states, we can integrate the conditional 
heterogeneity out by simulation and get what Wooldridge called “conditional” maximum 
likelihood estimates. Specifically, we add 14 brand-specific initial brand choices variables, as 
“brand”_ini in the model, and one brand propensity variable, iniacre in the model, constructed 
as the percentage of land planted with a brand in the initial state. These 15 variables are both 
                                                          
21 All Public seeds are conventional and all Channel seeds are associated with GT trait, so Public_GT and 
Channel_GT are collinear with the corresponding brand intercepts. We further take Kruger_GT as the 
baseline. If not, this set of variables will be collinear with the trait intercepts. 
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alternative-specific, coding only for brands purchased in the first period, and farmer-specific, 
different across farmers but same for all choices made by the same farmer. 
Finally, the last set of variables in hjmx  is to control for possible heterogeneity brought by 
marketing activities. Corresponding to the three purchase sources, we construct three 
marketing dummy variables—dealer, rep, and retailer in the model. For any given market, we 
say a source is active for a product (and thus the corresponding marketing variable take value 
1) if the corresponding brand is recorded to be purchased from this source in this market in 
any one of last three years. Thus, these marketing variables are market-product-specific, so 
they are same for all alternatives of a product among the market.22 Note that we do not use 
current year’s records to construct these marketing variables to avoid potential endogeneity 
issues (the purchase source and the choice decision are made simultaneously). We further 
interact these three variables with three individual-specific variables, coded as ind_dealer, 
ind_rep, ind_retailer, to capture farmers’ heterogeneous responses to the marketing 
variables. For each source, the corresponding individual-specific variable tells whether she has 
experience the purchase source in any previous period. 
To control for unobserved heterogeneity, our model allows heterogeneous responses to 
variables in jmw . However, to keep the computational burden of the model within tractable 
boundaries, jmw  does not contain all variables in hjmx . Specifically, jmw  consists of the GT trait 
intercepts over time, GT 1999-2004, GT 2005-2010, GT 2011-2016 and the brand intercepts, 
“brand”, a total of 16 variables. 
Additionally, the cost instruments are constructed as interactions of futures prices with brand 
and trait dummies. As noted by Fernandez-Cornejo and Spielman (2002), the cost of seed 
production can be contracted as adjusted yields times the futures prices of the product for 
contract farmer growers. Specifically, the futures prices are constructed from the futures 
                                                          
22 Note here the marketing variables are market-product-specific rather than farmer-product-specific. 
To generate farmer-product-specific marketing variables, the purchase source information is needed 
even for not chosen alternatives, which is not available in our case. 
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contract with a delivery month of November (right after the harvest season) as the average 
daily closing prices from January to March (before the planting season) as in Kim and Moschini 
(2018), who use futures prices as expected prices for farmer producers. The price records are 
from Quandl.23 We also deflate the futures prices by the USDA crop sector index of prices 
paid, consistent with all other prices in the model.  
5.3 Estimation Results 
Table 6 presents estimation results for four specifications:  the first three columns contain 
results for three different cases of the basic conditional logit model (i.e., the logit model 
without random coefficients), and the fourth and fifth columns contain the results for the full 
mixed logit model. For the conditional logit results, the first column (“No IV”) provides results 
for the case when price is assumed to be exogenous, the second column (“Main”) provides 
results with IVs included (i.e., the control function approach), and the third column “No state” 
omits the state dependence variable.   
Table 6. Estimation Results 
  Conditional logit   Mixed Logit 
 No IV Main No state  Main, coef Main, SD 
  b/(se) b/(se) b/(se)   b/(se) 
price -0.064*** -0.191*** -0.175***  -0.305***  
 (0.003) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.025)  
state 2.344*** 2.316***   2.065*** 0.932*** 
 (0.039) (0.040)   (0.045) (0.035) 
GT 1999-2004 1.524*** 3.141*** 2.942***  5.217*** 2.153*** 
 (0.137) (0.221) (0.207)  (0.388) (0.099) 
GT 2005-2010 2.881*** 4.573*** 4.355***  8.459*** 3.260*** 
 (0.139) (0.252) (0.235)  (0.507) (0.206) 
GT 2011-2016 2.122*** 3.224*** 3.076***  6.989*** 3.725*** 
 (0.157) (0.186) (0.181)  (0.371) (0.265) 
Asgrow (0.262) 2.181*** 2.493***  5.133*** 0.588*** 
 (0.202) (0.392) (0.421)  (0.632) (0.055) 
Beck's 0.848** 3.813*** 3.758***  5.730*** 1.990*** 
 (0.269) (0.449) (0.476)  (0.752) (0.142) 
Channel 0.230  2.669*** 2.631***  2.588*** 2.896*** 
 (0.225) (0.388) (0.416)  (0.693) (0.300) 
Croplan 0.274  3.076*** 3.009***  5.326*** -1.002*** 
 (0.206) (0.405) (0.430)  (0.650) (0.091) 
DeKalb -1.452*** 0.450 0.041  2.440*** 0.275*   
 (0.237) (0.369) (0.397)  (0.559) (0.131) 
                                                          
23 See https://www.quandl.com. 
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Golden -1.447*** 0.641 0.024  2.448*** 0.627*** 
 (0.312) (0.427) (0.463)  (0.607) (0.110) 
Growmark -0.388 2.224*** 1.947***  4.688*** 0.863*** 
 (0.249) (0.420) (0.445)  (0.661) (0.159) 
Kruger (0.471) 1.930*** 1.576***  3.392*** 1.542*** 
 (0.272) (0.442) (0.465)  (0.917) (0.315) 
Mycogen -0.148 2.221*** 1.891***  4.111*** 1.420*** 
 (0.229) (0.368) (0.409)  (0.609) (0.144) 
NK 0.131  2.550*** 2.520***  5.022*** 0.725*** 
 (0.182) (0.361) (0.389)  (0.568) (0.070) 
Other 0.268  2.491*** 2.718***  4.909*** 0.693*** 
 (0.170) (0.341) (0.369)  (0.547) (0.045) 
Pioneer 0.050 2.484*** 2.658***  5.318*** -0.356*** 
 (0.178) (0.359) (0.384)  (0.592) (0.091) 
Stine 0.093  2.391*** 2.018***  4.650*** 0.528*   
 (0.238) (0.396) (0.442)  (0.603) (0.223) 
dealer -0.159** -0.151** -0.101  -0.073  
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.061)  (0.058)  
ind_dealer 0.256*** 0.237*** 0.450***  0.179*    
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.070)  (0.070)  
rep 0.050* -0.019 0.019  -0.030  
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.030)  (0.030)  
ind_rep 0.088* 0.112** 0.355***  0.119**   
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.052)  (0.044)  
retailer 0.053  0.009  0.024   0.029   
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.059)  (0.061)  
ind_retailer -0.027 0.012 0.251***  0.069  
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.067)  (0.072)  
control  0.127*** 0.106***  0.207*** 0.184*** 
    (0.014) (0.013)   (0.025) (0.006) 
LL -124090.968 -123996.633 -151032.646  -108463.555 
N 1057637  1057637  1057637    1057637  
Note: standard errors are clustered at CRD level. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. The sign of 
the estimated standard deviations is irrelevant: consider them as positive. 
Looking across the estimation results, the coefficients are generally estimated with high 
precision, especially when the control function is used. The importance of the control function 
approach is also demonstrated by the difference in results between the “no IV” and the 
“Main” estimation results. The price coefficient decreases substantially from about -0.06 to -
0.19, suggesting that endogeneity was indeed present. Many of the brand coefficients 
become statistically significant and positive in magnitude. Given that public varieties are the 
reference product; this is more consistent with expectations.  The positive and significant 
estimate for the control residual (“control”) also suggests the existence of unobservable 
factors positively correlated with demand, a finding similar to that found in Petrin and Train 
(2009).  To demonstrate the influence of state dependence on the other coefficients, the third 
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column “No state” drops the state dependence term from the model. Here we see a sharp 
decrease in the log-likelihood, on the order of 25%, and there is some increase in the marketing 
variables. The remaining variables are relatively unchanged.  
As noted, the final two columns contain estimation results for the full mixed logit model, our 
preferred specification and the specification we later use to conduct some counterfactual 
exercises. The “Main, coef” and “Main, SD” reports the means and standard deviations of the 
corresponding coefficient. The full model results demonstrate the importance of specifying 
random coefficients for state dependence, the GT dummies, and the various brand dummies. 
As evidence of this, the log likelihood further decreases by more than 10% and all variance 
parameters are significant and large in magnitude. Taste variation is particularly large for the 
GT traits and the brands Channel, Kruger, and Mycogen.  The mean estimate for state 
dependence also decreases, suggesting some previous bias by not allowing for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Nonetheless, it still remains quite large in magnitude.24 This could be because 
it is truly large in magnitude or because our specification of unobserved heterogeneity is still 
not rich enough to capture the observed purchase patterns. We consider this issue further 
below.  
The mean coefficients for the GT and brand variables generally conform to expectations. All 
suggest a positive impact on the return to a soybean product. Further discussion of these 
variables and their economic importance are discussed in the next section where compute 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) distributions. The coefficients for the marketing variables are 
generally smaller in magnitude and less statistically significant. They do suggest that an active 
dealer or sales representative in the market can increase farmers’ probability of choosing the 
brand only if the farmer has purchased from the respective source before. If the farmer has 
no relevant source experience, an active dealer or sales representative of the brand in the 
local market may even decrease his probability of choosing the brand, although not 
                                                          
24 The coefficient of 2.065 is equivalent to an average marginal effect of 9 percentage points. That is, 
the average probability of choosing a particular brand will increase by 0.09 if it was purchased in the 
most recent observed period. 
- 32 - 
 
significantly. We also show that an active retailer source has little effect on the farmer’s 
probability of choosing the brand, regardless of her previous experience. 
Table 6 does not contain all of the estimated coefficients; the full set of results are provided 
in the Appendix. Among the omitted coefficients, there are a few noteworthy results.  First, 
essentially all initial conditions—the brand-specific dummy variables coding for whether a 
farmer purchased the brand in their first observed year—were positive and significant (except 
for Asgrow and Other), with the effects being the largest for smaller brands such as Beck’s, 
Growmark, Kruger, and Mycogen, and Channel.  Moreover, in including the initial conditions 
we found that the state dependence coefficient decreased significantly, suggesting these 
variables capture an important source of unobserved taste variation not captured by the 
random coefficients. A second set of results omitted from the table are the brand-GT trait 
interaction coefficients. Here we found that the GT trait is more valued under some brands 
than others. For example, the GT trait is most valued when sold under the Asgrow brand and 
least valued (relative to conventional varieites) in Beck’s varieties. Finally, the brand-period 
interaction coefficients, also omitted, indicate that, compared to the final period, all brands 
were valued less (relative to public varieties) in the first two periods. This is consistent with 
the decline in demand for public varieties.   
5.2 WTP distributions 
The estimated coefficients presented in Table 6, per se, are not terribly informative about the 
economic importance of the various factors that impact the profitability of soybean varieties. 
Therefore, we use the coefficient estimates from the mixed logit model to report the WTP 
distributions for the main variables of interest: the structural state dependence term, the GT 
coefficient, and the brand coefficients.  
The WTP for an attribute measures the maximum amount ($/unit) that a farmer is willing to 
part with for that characteristic. The WTP distribution for each attribute is obtained by dividing 
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its mean and variance coefficients by the price coefficient  (Train 2009).25 Because the random 
coefficients are normally distributed, and the price coefficient is a constant, the WTPs for each 
attribute are also normally distributed. The mean and variance of the WTP distributions for 
each variable of interest are reported in Table 7. 
Table 7. Estimated WTP distributions 
WTP Mean SD 
state 6.765 3.053 
GT 1999-2004 17.089 7.053 
GT 2005-2010 27.709 10.679 
GT 2011-2016 22.892 12.202 
Asgrow 16.814 1.926 
Beck’s 18.770 6.519 
Channel 8.477 9.486 
Croplan 17.447 3.282 
DeKalb 7.993 0.901 
Golden 8.020 2.054 
Growmark 15.357 2.827 
Kruger 11.110 5.051 
Mycogen 13.467 4.651 
NK 16.452 2.375 
Other 16.081 2.270 
Pioneer 17.422 1.166 
Stine 15.231 1.730 
We begin with the value of structural state dependence. On average, a farmer is willing to pay 
about 6.77 ($/unit) more for a brand if they purchased it in the previous period. Given that the 
mean price for a unit of soybeans is $45/unit, the state dependence effect is about 15% of the 
average, a relatively large effect and quite close to what Dubé, Hitsch, and Rossi (2010) find in 
the consumer-packaged goods industries.26 Put differently, experience is important: for two 
                                                          
25 We take advantage of the constant price coefficient. If the price coefficient is random, recovering 
the WTP distribution is trickier. See more discussions in Train & Weeks (2005) and Louviere et al. 
(2005). 
26 As shown in Table 5, the average retail seed price is $45/unit—$37/unit over the period 1999-2004, 
$44/unit in the period 2005-2010, and $53/unit in the period 2011-2016. All prices are deflated by the 
crop sector index of prices paid. To give these number additional context, the U.S. average soybean 
yield in 2018 was 51.6 bushels per acre and soybean price was $9.15/bushel, implying an average total 
gross revenue $398/unit (measured in 2018 dollar, adjusted by the unit/acre ratio). 
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otherwise equally valued products, a farmer is willing to pay significantly more for the one he 
has experience with. There is also significant heterogeneity in state dependence. A substantial 
number of farmers value an additional past experience at more than $9, whereas some 
farmers obtain little value from an additional experience.  
To give a visual depiction of the WTP distributions, Figure 2 provides drawn normal 
distributions for the state dependence and GT trait coefficients. This demonstrates that the 
value of structural state dependence is positive for nearly all farmers. The same can be said 
for the value of GT traits, and the vast majority of farmers place positive value on GT during 
all sub-periods. We can also see that the value of the GT trait is larger on average and more 
dispersed than the value of state dependence. This suggests that some farmers place very 
high value on the GT trait whereas other farmers do not. Consider, for example, that in the 
final period about 15% of farmers valued the GT trait at $35 or more, whereas another 15% 
valued the GT trait at $10 or less.  
Figure 2. WTP distributions for state and trait 
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The three different WTP distributions also demonstrate interesting changes over time. In the 
first period, 1999-2004, the average WTP is about 17.09 ($/unit), this increases to 27.71 ($/unit) 
in the second period (2005-2010), and then decreases to 22.89 ($/unit) in the third period (2011-
2016) (in $/acre terms, these values are $20.27/acre, $32.86/acre, and $27.15/acre, 
respectively).27  These changes essentially reflect the changing rate of GT soybean adoption 
over time. As noted in CIliberto, Moschini, & Perry (2019), the observed increase after the 
period 1999-2004 was likely the result of falling glyphosate prices (a complementary input to 
GT soybeans), rising output prices, learning, and/or an increasing number of varieties with GT. 
However, in the final period, the mean WTP for GT decreases and its variance increases (the 
orange line). This is consistent with some recent developments in the efficacy of GT soybeans.  
In recent years, glyphosate weed resistance has become increasing problematic (Perry, 
Ciliberto, Hennessy, and Moschini, 2016). Some farmers have responded by switching to non-
GT varieties or by increasing glyphosate application rates (Perry, Hennessy, Moschini, 2019). 
Glyphosate weed resistance also varies considerably across the U.S., which may explain the 
increasing variance in farmers’ WTP.  
The remaining entries in Table 7 represent farmers’ mean WTP for the each of the brands 
relative to public varieties in the last period (2011-2016). As expected, farmers are willing to 
pay a signficant premium for a branded product, with Asgrow, Beck’s, and Pioneer having 
some of the highest WTPs. There is also considerable heterogeneity. Generally, the larger 
brands such as Asgrow, Pioneer, and NK have the most concentrated WTPs, whereas some of 
the mid-size to smaller brands like Beck’s and Channel have widely distributed tastes.   
5.3 Demand elasticities 
A major advatange of our framework, as contrasted with the basic logit model, is that it can 
capture rich substitution patterns between seed varieties. To demonstrate these patterns, we 
compute and report simulated mean own-price and cross-price demand elasticities for each 
product. To compute these elasticities, we compute predicted market shares for each product 
                                                          
27 In Ciliberto, Moschini, and Perry (2019), the WTP for the GT trait in soybeans was $16.68/acre in 1996-
2000, $23.25/acre in 2001-2006, and $24.66/acre in 2007-2011. 
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j , denoted jS . To obtain these shares, we first predict farm-level probabilities for each 
product using the estimated coefficients from the full mixed logit model. Because this model 
includes random coefficients, this is done through simulation. Given the individual level 
probabilities, we then aggregate to the product-market level using the observed number of 
purchased units for each farmer as weights. To generate the elasticities, we change the price 
for each product k  by a small amount k kp p′ − ,  and then recompute the aggregate prediced 
market share for product j , denoted by jS′ . The elasticity of demand for product j  with 












   (12) 
where jje  is the own-price elasticity of demand and ( )jke j k≠  represents the cross-price 
elasticity of demand j  for product k . 
Table 8 contains the full matrix of elasticities. Each product j  is listed in the first column and 
each product k  is listed in the top row. Thus, the own-price and cross-price elasticities of 
demand for product j  with respect to a change in the price of product k  are reported in the 
corresponding row. For example, the top-left entry of “-6.20” corresponding to Asgrow0 and 
AS0 is the own-price elasticity of demand for Asgrow0; the value to the right of this, “0.03”, 
corresponding to  Asgrow0 and BE0, is the cross-price elasticity of demand for Asgrow0 with 
respect to a change in the price of Beck’s0. Note that we use “0” to represent conventional 
products and “1” to represent GT products. In the first row of Table 8, to save space, we only 
use the first two letters of each brand. We further divide Table 8 into 4 sub-matrices—the top 
left panel contains elasticities for conventional products with respect to other conventional 
products, the top right panel contains elasticities for conventional products with respect to 
GT products, the bottom left panel contains elasticities for GT products with respect to 
conventional products, and the bottom right panel contains elasticities for GT products with 
respect to GT products. Grouping it this way allows us to see some clear patterns in the 
elasticities. 
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The orange cells in Table 8 contain the own-price demand elasticities for each product. They 
are all negative and highly elastic, typically ranging from about -5 to as high as -8.8. The values 
are also similar to the estimated mean own-price elasticties reported  in CIliberto, Moschini, & 
Perry (2019). In their preferred model, they find a mean own-price elasticity of -7.04 for corn 
and soybean products. We also note that GT products are slightly more elastic than 
conventional products, which may in part be the result of higher prices for GT products.  
The blue cells highlight cross-price elasticities for different products marketed with the same 
brand. Because not all brands posses both GT and conventional products (Channel and 
Public), there is some asymmetry along the alignment of the blue cells. Cells highlighted in 
green identify the closest substitute for each product k : this is simply the cell with the highest 
value in each column (excluding the own-price elasticities). If this cell also happens to be the 
product with the same brand, then it is highlighted in blue-green.  
Three intuitive regularities emerge from the cross-price elasticies. First, generally speaking, a 
farmer is more likely to substitute between products that contain the same trait. We term this 
the “trait effect”. Put differently, if a product with GT is a farmer’s most preferred variety, it 
is significantly more likely that their next preferred product also has GT. This can be seen by 
the fact that the upper left and lower right blocks of cross-price elasticities are typically larger 
compared to the lower left and upper right blocks (the main exception to this is the cross-
substition from GT to conventional products of the same brand). Second, individuals are 
typically more likely to substitute products of the same brand. We call this the “brand effect”.  
Consider, for example, how individuals substitute from ASo to products with GT (the first 
column in the lower left block of Table 8). Among all such products, farmers are most likely to 
substitue to Asgrow1: the value of 0.07 exceeds all other values in the lower left panel. Notice, 
however, that the cross-price elasticites for all conventional products from ASo are greater 
than 0.07. Thus, in this case, the trait effect dominates the brand effect. More generally, for 
conventional products, the trait effect usually dominates the brand effect (though not 
always). This is evidenced by the fact that the majority of green cells for conventional 
products are in the upper right block. Conversely, for GT products, the closest substitute is 
almost always the identically branded conventional version. For example, the closest 
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Table 8. Own-price and cross-price elasticities of demand 
elasticity AS0 BE0 CR0 DE0 GO0 GR0 KR0 MY0 NK0 OT0 PI0 PU0 ST0 AS1 BE1 CH1 CR1 DE1 GO1 GR1 KR1 MY1 NK1 OT1 PI1 ST1 
Asgrow0 -6.20 0.03 0.06 0.19 0.21 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.77 0.52 0.16 0.16 2.50 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.26 0.20 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.17 0.93 0.72 0.13 
Beck’s0 0.14 -6.94 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.75 0.69 0.04 0.16 0.84 1.92 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.27 0.86 0.93 0.09 
Croplan0 0.16 0.04 -6.14 0.14 0.15 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.84 0.55 0.16 0.22 0.75 0.04 0.03 0.99 0.23 0.19 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.25 1.01 0.87 0.17 
DeKalb0 0.32 0.04 0.10 -6.22 0.23 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.78 0.56 0.17 0.22 0.70 0.04 0.00 0.08 1.58 0.24 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.94 0.74 0.14 
Golden0 0.25 0.03 0.07 0.16 -5.69 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.76 0.46 0.13 0.19 0.67 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.26 1.59 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.17 1.02 0.68 0.15 
Growmark0 0.29 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.15 -5.79 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.61 0.52 0.11 0.16 0.64 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.20 0.19 1.85 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.76 0.74 0.12 
Kruger0 0.23 0.00 0.11 0.14 0.20 0.05 -4.97 0.09 0.12 0.60 0.42 0.08 0.20 0.55 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.23 0.21 0.06 1.79 0.06 0.16 0.76 0.59 0.14 
Mycogen0 0.19 0.01 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.05 0.06 -5.29 0.13 0.56 0.42 0.14 0.17 0.60 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.24 0.22 0.06 0.06 1.04 0.15 0.96 0.68 0.14 
NK0 0.24 0.01 0.10 0.13 0.19 0.04 0.05 0.10 -5.91 0.79 0.51 0.17 0.13 0.63 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.06 0.06 1.49 1.01 0.76 0.13 
Other0 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.06 -4.74 0.38 0.13 0.13 0.72 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.26 2.76 0.73 0.11 
Pioneer0 0.18 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.71 -5.65 0.12 0.14 0.70 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.24 0.86 2.62 0.11 
Public0 0.19 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.88 0.43 -3.40 0.15 0.87 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.22 0.19 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.31 1.41 0.89 0.14 
Stine0 0.19 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.94 0.52 0.15 -5.97 0.83 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.21 0.22 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.25 1.01 0.86 1.03 
Asgrow1 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.02 -6.76 0.12 0.14 0.28 0.25 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.66 1.93 1.87 0.19 
Beck’s1 0.02 0.32 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.01 0.01 1.31 -6.67 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.49 1.64 1.56 0.16 
Channel1 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.07 0.01 0.02 1.56 0.16 -7.29 0.24 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.17 0.69 1.71 1.80 0.19 
Croplan1 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.07 0.03 0.02 1.95 0.13 0.15 -8.79 0.25 0.20 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.88 2.21 1.95 0.27 
DeKalb1 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.12 0.04 0.03 1.86 0.11 0.03 0.25 -8.24 0.41 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.58 2.01 1.61 0.26 
Golden1 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.26 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.11 0.03 0.04 1.24 0.08 0.00 0.21 0.44 -7.34 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.51 1.84 1.33 0.25 
Growmark1 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.11 0.03 0.03 1.59 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.26 0.23 -8.03 0.14 0.09 0.56 1.61 1.71 0.26 
Kruger1 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.03 1.26 0.04 0.10 0.24 0.30 0.29 0.12 -6.77 0.13 0.55 1.55 1.40 0.26 
Mycogen1 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.03 1.64 0.09 0.20 0.30 0.18 0.17 0.07 0.10 -7.85 0.71 1.90 1.77 0.24 
NK1 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.02 1.72 0.11 0.16 0.32 0.21 0.17 0.08 0.09 0.14 -7.66 2.06 1.92 0.22 
Other1 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.36 0.06 0.02 0.02 1.35 0.11 0.11 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.56 -5.33 1.46 0.17 
Pioneer1 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.21 0.02 0.02 1.50 0.11 0.13 0.22 0.18 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.60 1.66 -5.57 0.17 
Stine1 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.10 0.03 0.21 1.61 0.12 0.13 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.71 2.10 1.82 -8.26 
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substitute for AS1 is Asgrowo (value of 2.50). The trait effect, however, dominates if we 
exclude the conventional Asgrow variety; the closest substitutes for AS1 are all non-Asgrow 
GT products. Finally, there is a strong assymetry in the cross-price elasticities between GT and 
conventional products of the same brand. For example, the cross-price elasticity of 0.07 from 
ASo to Asgrow1 is a small fraction of the cross-price elasticity of 2.50 from AS1 to Asgrowo. 
This is simply due to the fact that GT products typically have much larger shares compared to 
the identically branded conventional versions (specifically, the denominator of equation (13) 
is much smaller for conventional products). 
5.4 Reshuffling 
Although our framework permits unobserved heterogeneity for all brands, we do restrict this 
heterogeneity to follow a normal distribution. Previous research has shown that, even having 
controlled for unobserved heterogeneity, it is still possible to incorrectly find positive 
evidence of structural state dependence if that unobserved heterogeneity is not sufficiently 
flexible enough. The term for this is spurious state dependence. To check whether 
unobserved heterogeneity has been captured in a sufficiently rich way, we conduct a 
reshuffling procedure along the lines of Dubé, Hitsch, & Rossi (2010) and Bronnenberg, Dubé, 
& Moorthy (2018). The basic idea of this procedure is to reshuflle the choice sequences in a 
random way and then re-estimate the full mixed logit model. This exploits the fact that 
structural state dependence should in principle only be identified by non-zero order features 
in the data, what some authors have referred to as “spells”. If we have sufficiently controlled 
for unobserved heterogeneity, then the state dependent parameter should go to zero. On the 
other hand, if the estimate for γ  remains large and positive, this may suggest that our original 
estimate is spurious and is likely due to an insufficiently rich accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity.   
For reshuffling, we first generate a new time variable whose values are drawn from a discrete 
uniform distribution with values ranging from 1996-2016. We then replace the original time 
variable with this new, randomly generated time variable. Consequently, we build a 
“reshuffled” purchase history for each farmer, which results in a new “randomized” state 
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dependence term. In the process, three of the marketing variables are also reconstructed: 
ind_dealer, ind_rep, and ind_retailer. All other explanatory variables are held fixed 
throughout the reshuffle process. In other words, instead of randomly reshuffling the 
purchase sequence for each individual and then reconstructing new market-specific choice 
sets, we maintain the original choice set for each individiual and thereby only reshuffle the 
state dependence term. We do it this way for the following reasons. The main reason is that 
the industry has experienced signficant structural changes during the observed timespan—
some brands have exited and entered the industry, prices have risen, and the GT trait has 
come to dominate. For these reasons, fully reconstructed choice-sets would have 
unreasonable properties. Consider the following example. Suppose an individual purchased 
the brand Channel with GT in 2015, and that upon reshuffling the new, randomly assigned year 
was 1996. If choice-sets were fully recontstructed, then Channel with GT will enter the choice 
set of all farmers in this local CRD in 1996 and its price will be an average price of all 
corresponding Channel products after reshuffle. This raises three problems: (i) Channel only 
enters the market after 2009; (ii) seed prices in the later periods are significantly higher than 
in early periods, even after deflation; and (iii) the size of any choice-set is subject to change in 
the reconstruction process. 
The model results after reshuffling the data are presented in Table 9. We report results for  
two types of models: the basic conditional logit model, where unobserved heterogeneity is 
not captured by random coefficients, and the mixed logit model, which controls for 
unobserved heteroegeneity through the inclusion of random coefficients for the brand and 
trait dummies.   
Overall,  the coefficient for structural state dependence significantly decreases in both 
models, suggesting that state dependence is indeed a feature of soybean seed demand. In 
the conditional logit model, the coefficient decreases from 2.316 to 1.218, whereas in the 
mixed logit model, the coefficient decrease from 2.065 to 0.462. The smaller decrease in state 
dependence for the conditional logit model highlights the importance of controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
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Table 9. Model results after reshuffling the choice sequences 
  Conditional logit   Mixed logit 
 Main  Main, coef Main, SD 
  b/se   b/se    
price -0.181***  -0.264***  
 (0.014)  (0.024)  
state 1.218***  0.462*** 0.339*** 
 (0.028)  (0.031) (0.079) 
GT 1999-2004 3.013***  4.696*** 2.079*** 
 (0.210)  (0.331) (0.111) 
GT 2005-2010 4.437***  7.515*** 2.687*** 
 (0.238)  (0.403) (0.189) 
GT 2011-2016 3.129***  6.833*** 4.098*** 
 (0.184)  (0.393) (0.318) 
Asgrow 2.375***  4.008*** 1.120*** 
 (0.413)  (0.683) (0.050) 
Beck 3.822***  4.380*** 2.751** 
 (0.469)  (1.166) (1.040) 
Channel 2.702***  1.575* 3.142*** 
 (0.408)  (0.745) (0.201) 
Croplan 3.056***  4.262*** -1.252*** 
 (0.421)  (0.678) (0.132) 
DeKalb 0.133   1.295* 0.634*** 
 (0.383)  (0.623) (0.168) 
Golden 0.087   0.653  1.362*** 
 (0.465)  (0.701) (0.104) 
Growmark 2.045***  3.160*** 1.581*** 
 (0.432)  (0.665) (0.269) 
Kruger 1.703***  1.683* 2.171*** 
 (0.458)  (0.788) (0.181) 
Mycogen 2.011***  2.778*** 1.782*** 
 (0.398)  (0.715) (0.171) 
NK 2.544***  4.039*** 1.149*** 
 (0.381)  (0.625) (0.107) 
Other 2.569***  4.006*** 1.159*** 
 (0.363)  (0.601) (0.089) 
Pioneer 2.597***  4.274*** 0.891*** 
 (0.379)  (0.637) (0.128) 
Stine 2.119***  3.484*** 0.985*** 
 (0.430)  (0.728) (0.288) 
control 0.113***  0.169*** 0.170*** 
 (0.013)  (0.025) (0.007) 
LL -141776.678   -117337.689 
N 1057637    1057637  
Note: standard errors are clustered at CRD level. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. The sign of the estimated  
standard deviations is irrelevant: consider them as positive. 
While the state dependence coefficient does decrease signficantly in both cases, particularly 
in the full model, it still remains positive with a coefficient of 0.462. This may suggest that the 
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assumption of normally distirbuted random coefficients is not rich enough and therefore a 
portion of our original state dependence estimate is spurious. We note, however, that an 
alternative possiblity is that this is the result of a higher-order Markov chain (more distant 
purchases may still have some impact on farmers’ seed choice), or even the result of our large 
sample size. In any case, our reshuffling procedure suggests that at least 80% of what we 
captured in the mixed logit model in Table 6 is the result of genuine structural state 
dependence. To the extent that there is some bias in the structural state dependence 
coefficient, it is small (about $1.6/unit). 
6. Counterfactual analysis 
Over the last three decades, the seed markets have been characterized by significant 
technological innovation (in the form of GE traits) and changing market structure (e.g., higher 
concentration). In this section, we assess some potential implications of state dependence, 
especially as it pertains to the introduction and diffusion of the GT technology.  
In section 6.1, we explore whether state dependence affected the diffusion of the GT 
technology. In particular, we simulate GT adoption rates in two scenarios: one with state 
dependence and the other without state dependence. In section 6.2, we examine how state 
dependence and the GT technology contributed to changing brand shares in the industry.  To 
do so, we simulate brand market shares in four settings: (i) an environment with both the GT 
trait and state dependence; (ii) an industry without the GT trait but still with state 
dependence; (iii) an industry with the GT trait but without state dependence; and (iv) an 
industry with neither GT nor state dependence. We are particularly interested in whether 
state dependence conferred an “early mover” advantage for brands that were the first to 
embed and offer the GT trait in their seed varieties. This is similar to the question of whether 
there is an advantage to being the first brand to locate in a particular geographic region 
(Bronnenberg, Dhar, and Dubé 2009; Bronnenberg, Dubé, and Gentzkow 2012), however, our 
exploration assesses whether state dependence confers an advantage to those brands first 
to locate in a new dimension of the product space.  
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6.1 GT adoption rate 
To assess the importance of structural state dependence for the diffusion of a new major 
technology, in this case GT adoption, we calculate predicted GT adoption rates under two 
different scenarios: in the first scenario (or baseline scenario), we simply generate predicted 
GT adoption rates using the estimated coefficients from the full mixed logit model. In the 
counterfactual scenario, we compute predicted GT adoption rates under the assumption that 
there is no structural state dependence; i.e., when 0hγ = . For comparison, we also present 
the observed adoption rate (“original data”). As was done for the computation of elasticities, 
we first compute predicted individual demands and then aggregate those demands to 
national level using the observed amount of purchased units as weights. The GT adoption rate 
is calculated by summing over the predicted shares of products that contain GT. However, 
unlike in section 5.3, where we used the observed purchase history for the state dependence 
variable, here we reconstruct the state dependence variable using the predicted purchase 
probabilities from the most recent period. See the Appendix for further discussion and details 
on how the predictions were generated. 
Figure 3 presents GT adoption rates for each case; black represents the observed rate, blue 
for the baseline model prediction, and red for the counterfactual scenario without state 
dependence. The results show that our model does fairly good job of predicting the GT 
adoption rate (the black line and the blue line). However, the model is least accurate in the 
first period (1999-2004). This likely has to do with how we have specified the GT-period 
interaction variables. In the first period (1999-2004), the coefficient on the GT-period 
interaction variable is fixed. Because actual adoption rates changed significantly during this 
time, there is over-estimation in the first couple years (1999-2000) and an under-estimation in 
the last few years (2002-2004). 
By comparing the scenario without state dependence to the scenario with state dependence, 
we see that state dependence has little effect on the diffusion of GT varieties. There is a very 
small positive effect in the first few years (the red line is below the blue line before 2002), but 
the effect is negligible in later years. In some ways, this isn’t terribly surprising. In order for 
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state dependence to impact the GT adoption rate it would need to be the case that by 
removing state dependence there is a systemic shift in preferences towards either varieties 
with GT (or without). In our case, this should happen through differentiated GT products of 
different brands (some brands have GT products, some do not). However, because of 
aggressive licensing of GT traits to other seed suppliers by Monsanto, most brands in the 
industry added GT to their varieties very quickly.  
Figure 3. GT adoption rates over time 
 
6.2 Brand market shares 
Using the full model estimates, we simulate brand market shares in four settings: (i) an 
environment with both the GT trait and state dependence; (ii) an industry without the GT trait 
but still with state dependence; (iii) an industry with the GT trait but without state 
dependence; and (iv) an industry with neither GT nor state dependence. As done previously, 
we first compute predicted individual demands in each scenario and then aggregate to the 
national level for each brand using projected purchased units as weights.  
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In simulating scenarios without the GT trait, there is an important issue that needs to be 
resolved. One way to simulate the non-GT counterfactual would be to remove GT products 
from farmers’ choice sets. However, because GT products had almost completely crowded 
out non-GT products by 2007, this would artificially reduce farmers’ options. Therefore, we 
construct the non-GT counterfactual in a more cautious way—we remove the GT attribute 
from a product (rather than remove the product) and maintain the newly created “synthetic” 
conventional product if there was no pre-existing conventional version. For example, consider 
the brand Channel, which was only sold with the GT trait. Under this counterfactual, the 
product Channel1 becomes Channel0. 
In conducting this exercise an additional issue that needs to be addressed is what the prices 
for these new alternatives would have been in the counterfactual. As noted in CIliberto, 
Moschini, & Perry (2019), a structural equilibrium model may be ideal but difficult to execute 
in the seed market because of cross-licensing for GT traits. Thus, we follow the approach of 
Hausman & Leonard (2002) by using a hedonic price regression to construct the 
counterfactual prices.  
6.2.1 Hedonic price regression 
As discussed previously, we construct a contingent price system to account for seasonal 
discounts in seed prices. Consequently, we run two hedonic regressions, one for market retail 
prices, and one for market net prices, and then assign the corresponding prices to each choice 
set, contingent on whether a discount was received. The hedonic regression is written as 
follows:  
 jm jm m t l jmp x D eφ θ ξ ξ′= + + + +    (13) 
We estimate this regression at the market level—there are 21,008 observations across 2,609 
markets, with roughly 8 alternatives per market. The vector jmx  contains all variables in jmx
except the initial conditions and the interactions of marketing variables with individual 
purchasing experiences. To capture any potential competitive price effects from the 
introduction of GT products, we add mD  as in CIliberto, Moschini, and Perry (2019), which is 
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an indicator variable of whether GT product is purchased in the market. The last two variables 
tξ  and lξ   are time fixed effects and CRD fixed effects, respectively, where t   and l   are both 
identified by market m . Finally, jme  is an idiosyncratic shock, which is assumed to be 
exogenous with all explanatory variables. 
The hedonic regression results are presented in Table 10, which contains estimated 
coefficients for the GT-period interaction variables, the brand intercepts (in the last period), 
and the indicator variable for the presence of GT products. These results convey the average 
price premiums that seed companies charge for GT varieties. Generally, GT seeds are 
associated with higher prices, with the premium being the smallest in the final period. Our 
estimates are very close with the results from a more comprehensive hedonic regression in 
CIliberto, Moschini, & Perry (2019).28 We see a drop in the price premium for GT trait in the 
last period, which is in line with the WTP estimates in Table 7. Comparing the regression of 
retail prices and that of net prices, it shows that the price premium is lower for GT trait in the 
last two periods, which may imply that GT products are generally associated with more 
discounts in those periods. Furthermore, note that the estimates here are smaller than the 
WTP estimates in Table 7, suggesting the potential welfare gains of farmers during the 
introduction of this new technology (Ciliberto, Moschini, and Perry, 2019) 
Finally, the coefficient of the GT indicator variable is insignificant, which may be ascribed to a 
lack of observations. As our regression start price 1999, when the GT adoption rate is over 
50%, only 2 markets with 5 observations are absent of GT products: the variable mD  can hardly 
be identified in our case. 
  
                                                          
28 In CIliberto, Moschini, & Perry (2019), they estimate hedonic regressions for both soybean seeds and 
corn seeds. Adjusted by unit/acre ratio, they find that the price premium is 12.993 $/unit for soybean 
GT trait in 1996-2000, 11.660 $/unit for soybean GT trait in 2001-2006, and 9.627 $/unit for soybean GT 
trait in 2007-2011. 
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Table 10. Hedonic prices 
  Retail Net 
  b/se b/se    
GT 1999-2004 10.906*** 10.717*** 
 (0.290) (0.261) 
GT 2005-2010 11.731*** 10.643*** 
 (0.313) (0.281) 
GT 2011-2016 7.391*** 5.987*** 
 (0.300) (0.269) 
D 3.542 3.662 
 (2.275) (2.042) 
R2 0.822  0.807  
N 21008  21008  
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
To construct the counterfactual prices, we set the indicators of trait to zero, which consist of 
GT trait variables in all three period as well as the interactions of GT with each brand. We then 
use the model estimates to predict counterfactual retail prices and net price, and further 
assign corresponding predicted prices to counterfactual choice sets contingent on whether 
the original purchase is offered a discount. 
6.2.2 Brand market shares in four scenarios 
The following Figure 4 depicts market shares of the two largest brands, Pioneer and Asgrow, 
in three of the four scenarios—with both state dependence and GT (blue), without state 
dependence but with GT (red), without GT but with state dependence (orange). To check our 
model fit, as in section 6.1, we add a black line to represent the observed market shares from 
the original data.  
Comparing the blue line and the black line, we see that our model can capture the general 
trend and the magnitude of the true market shares but the model is not good at matching the 
year-by-year variance, which may be related to our classification of the three periods.  
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Figure 4. Market shares of Asgrow and Pioneer in three of the four scenarios 
 
Figure 4 also shows that state dependence and the GT trait have different implications for 
Asgrow and Pioneer. The GT trait benefits both brands, but to different degrees: GT confers 
a larger increase in shares for Asgrow than for Pioneer, especially in the final period. Each 
brand is also affected by the presence of state dependence, but here the effects go in the 
opposite direction. Whereas Pioneer is benefitted by state dependence, Asgrow is slightly 
hurt by state dependence. We speculate that these differences are the result of differences 
in market shares: intuitively, larger brands benefit more from state dependence, as more 
farmers are willing to pay a premium to purchase them. Indeed, for the remaining brands, all 
smaller than Asgrow and Pioneer, state dependence has a detrimental impact on market 
share.   
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Figure 5. Simulated market shares for the big 3 brands (Asgrow, NK, Pioneer)  
 
We next examine the implications of the GT trait and state dependence for market 
concentration. Figure 5 contains total aggregate market share for the big 3 brands as of the 
final period: Pioneer, Asgrow, and NK. We first note that the market is increasingly 
concentrated over time, with the three big three obtaining more than 50% of the market by 
the final period. Second, the GT trait was also a significant contributor to concentration, 
raising the big three share by about 10%. Third, state dependence does not have a significant 
effect on market concentration. This appears to be the result of the benefits for Pioneer being 
cancelled out by the losses for Asgrow and NK.  
6.2.3 Structural benefits from GT  
Although Figure 4 clearly depicts the impacts of removing the GT trait for Asgrow and Pioneer, 
it does not provide clarity on the question of whether structural state dependence affects the 
market share impacts of the GT trait. To explore this question, Figure 6 contains market share 
impacts of the GT trait with and without state dependence for Asgrow and Pioneer. 
Specifically, the blue line represents the gain in market share from the GT trait when state 
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dependence is present, which we denote by _ btGT state ; and the red line represents the 
change in market share from the GT trait when state dependence is absent, denoted by 
_ btGT nostate  .  
Figure 6. Market share benefits from GT  
 
By comparing the blue line and the red one, we see that state dependence has actually 
reduced the benefits of the GT trait for Asgrow and Pioneer. This may have something to do 
with changes in shares over time; generally, when share increase, state dependence seems to 
have a negative effect. 
Figure 6 demonstrates the impact of the GT trait and state dependence for the entire sample 
period. However, state dependence may exert the largest influence in the early stages of 
adoption through an “early mover” effect. Conceptually, if a brand is one of the first to offer 
a new technology, in this case the GT trait, it can attract new customers. Throught state 
dependence, it can obtain an extra advantage relative to brand that add the GT trait later on. 
In in the industry, Asgrow, NK, and Pioneer were all early adopters and also the three largest 
brand at the end of our timespan. To investigate the issue of whether there was an early 
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mover advantage, we regress _ btGT state  on early adoption rates, denoted by br , for each 
brand. The early adoption rate is defined as the product-specific average market share of the 
GT trait in the first two years, 1996 and 1997.29 In the regression, we discard observations for 
“PUBLIC” and “CHANNEL”, so there are 216=18 (number of years) *12 (=14-2, number of 
considered brands) total observations. The regression we estimate is written as  
 = + ,_ bt b btGT state ar u    (14) 
where btu  is a brand-time-specific error term. The results are shown in the first column of Table 
10. 
The coefficient of br  is both positive and significant, along with a high 2R , suggesting that a 
brand’s structural benefits from the GT technology can largely be explained by the degree to 
which it was an early seller of the technology. However, this result does not convey the impact 
of state dependence this benefit. Therefore, we estimate a second specification that 
conditions on the GT impact that is not due to state dependence (denoted by _ btGT nostate ). 
This variable controls for other brand-specific factors related to early adoption, such as more 
varieties with the GT trait or a better distribution channel. This  regression is written as: 
 _ _bt b bt btGT state ar bGT Nostate u= + +     (15) 
Table 10. How brands benefit from early adoption of GT seeds 
 reg1 reg2 
 b/se b/se 
br  2.867*** 0.357*** 
 (0.126) (0.081) 
_ btGT state   0.773*** 
  (0.020) 
R2 0.708 0.962 
N 216 216 
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
                                                          
29 The regression is estimated on the sample period 1999-2016.  This is done to create a gap between 
the time when the early adoption shares are computed (1996-1997) and when the GT share impacts 
are regressed. 
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The results are reported in the second column “reg2” of Table 10. After controlling for benefits 
of GT technology without state dependence, we see that the coefficient of br  has a sharp 
drop, suggesting that the early adoption of the GT technology benefits the brand mainly 
through the brand-specific factors. However, the coefficient of br  is still positive and 
significant, suggesting the brand also benefits from early adoption through structural state 
dependence. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we develop and estimate a micro-level structural model of U.S. soybean seed 
demand to study a recurring theme in economics and marketing, brand inertia. To disentangle 
unobserved heterogeneity from state dependence, we adopt the random coefficients logit 
model for demand estimation. To deal with the initial conditions problem, we use the initial 
brand choices as an extra explanatory variables. To deal with price endogeneity, we apply the 
control function approach, using the previous year’s futures price as a cost instrument and 
interacting them with brand and GT trait dummies.  
Our results show that structural state dependence generally exists for all farmers, with an 
average WTP of $6.77/unit, which is about 15% of the average soybean retail price of $45/unit. 
We also find that state dependence is quite heterogeneous—state dependence is valued at 
more than  $10/unit for 15% of farmers, whereas another 15% values it at less than $4/unit. Along 
with demand estimation, we show that farmers’ WTPs for the GT trait vary over time and over 
individuals. On average, the WTP for GT is $17.09/unit during 1999-2004, goes up to $27.71/unit 
during 2005-2010, and then declines to $22.89/unit during 2011-2016. Adjusted by unit/acre 
ratio, our results are consistent with the WTP estimates reported by Ciliberto, Moschini, and 
Perry (2019), who employ a different modeling approach. Our finding of declining WTP for the 
GT trait in the 2011-2016 period is also consistent with the emergence of glyphosate resistant 
weed (Perry, Ciliberto, Hennessy, and Moschini, 2016). We further show that farmers are quite 
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heterogeneous towards GT traits, with much higher variance than the state dependence 
coefficient.  
Using the estimated model, we generate own and cross-price demand elasticities for each 
product. We find that the own-price elasticities are, on average, -5.4 for conventional products 
and -7 for GT products. Generally, farmers are more likely to substitute among products of the 
same brand and same trait, however, the strength of these effects differ depending on the 
type product. In particular, a farmer is more likely to switch to another conventional product 
for a different brand if she chooses a conventional product, whereas she is more likely to 
switch to the conventional product of the same brand if she chooses a GT product. 
Finally, we assess some potential implications of state dependence during the introduction 
and diffusion of the GT technology. We obtain four main findings. First, we find that state 
dependence has almost no effect on the diffusion of GT varieties, a reflection of the fact that 
most brands in the industry added the GT trait to their varieties very quickly. Second, we show 
that brands benefit differently from state dependence. The largest brand, Pioneer, benefits 
from state dependence whereas the other, smaller brands are negatively affected. Next, 
concerning the impact of GT on brand market shares, we show that state dependence acts as 
a cushion—it pulls the effect of GT trait diffusion, whether positive or negative, back to zero. 
Finally, we examine whether state dependence confers an advantage to early providers of the 
new technology. The result is small but significantly positive: brands benefit from early 
adoption, even after controlling for the benefits of GT when state dependence is absent. 
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